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MINORALDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CERTIFIC INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: IAC Agency Views on NIE-53: Probable Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Carmany during 1952

- 1. With reference to paragraph 8 of the estimate, ANT disagrees with the view of the other agencies and the Board that a complete ground blockade will not be reinstituted in Berlin so long as the Fremlin hopes to influence the course of events in West Germany. (CMI has not yet submitted a footnote stating its view.) The other agencies and the Board base their view on the belief that any such action would tend to accelerate West German rearmament, the very thing the Fremlin is now using every means to block or retard.
- 2. The Air Force takes the same exception it took to NIE-50, namely, that the possibility of a Seviet withdrawal from East Germany should not be ignored. The other agencies and the Board believe withdrawal is unlikely during 1952, because of the overwhelming evidence of Soviet intent to integrate East Germany with the Soviet orbit and because the Soviets would lose very great economic, military, and political advantages if they withdraw.
- J. During the consideration of the estimate, some agency representatives urged that MIE-4, mublished on 1 February 1951, is still valid and could have been reaffirmed with a few necessary revisions. In scope, the present estimate covers the same ground as MIE-4 and supersedes it. The Board thinks MIE-4 failed to distinguish relative degrees of probability in various possible Soviet actions and left open important questions on which it is now possible to estimate. MIE-53, in the Board's view, provides a much firmer basis for policy decisions.
- 4. Since MID-53 is very brief and is itself a sories of conclusions, it was agreed that separate conclusions would be swerfluous.

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